NO: FST-CR20-0241178-T

FST-CR19-0167364-T FST-CR19-0148553-T : SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

: JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF STAMFORD/NORWALK

V.

: AT STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT

MICHELLE TROCONIS

: FEBRUARY 2, 2021

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. BLAWIE, JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

Representing the State of Connecticut:

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THE COURT: Good morning. This is State of Connecticut versus Michelle Troconis, would Counsel please identify themselves for the record.

ATTY. COLANGELO: Richard Colangelo with Dan Cummings and Paul Ferencek for the State.

THE COURT: Thank you.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Jon Schoenhorn representing Michelle Troconis who is appearing remotely today.

THE COURT: Yes, good morning. Good morning, Counsel, good morning, ma'am.

Well, before the court today is the state's motion to join these Informations and the defense objection thereto. The court would also like to take up the defense motion to modify the non-financial conditions of Ms. Troconis's release. But I'd like to get to the motion to joinder argument first.

So only one state's attorney is going to be making the argument, who's -- who have you elected to proceed on behalf of the state?

ATTY. COLANGELO: Attorney Cummings, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Great.

Attorney Cummings, it's -- you have the floor.

I've read the briefs and I'm ready to listen to what
you and your colleague have to say.

You're muted.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Thank you. Sorry, are you able to hear me now?

THE COURT: Yes.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Okay. Your Honor, I won't belabor what's in the brief, I think I summarized the state's case in there as best I could.

As Your Honor is aware, having presided over this type of motion many, many times, the trial court has significant discretion in determining whether to join cases together for one trial. The interests that are promoted by joinder are -- are large.

In essence, a joint trial would ameliorate the need to put on the same witnesses repeatedly, to tie up judicial staff, it would expedite justice for both the state and the defendant.

The test that our Supreme Court utilizes in determining whether a joint trial is appropriate is whether substantial injustice is going to fall on the defendant. In cases where evidence would be cross admissible, the court has found that there is no substantial injustice. And the reasons for that are pretty, I think, obvious. If the evidence is going to come in anyway at one of the trials, then, frankly, what's the point in doing it more than once?

So then the only question is does the evidence come in? And I think in a case like this, the clear answer to that is yes, the evidence is going to come in. These charges across all three docket numbers are pretty much part and parcel with each other.

This is a broad conspiracy charge, there's multiple moving parts to it, but they all pertain to the same end goal which was the scheme to murder Jennifer Dulos.

Now, the conspiracy can be divided into different parts. There's the -- the agreement, there's the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and there's the cover up. But it's pretty impossible to put on any evidence pertaining to one of those parts while segregating the rest of the evidence from the trial.

I don't think the court can do that. It would take some pretty significant and very detailed rulings to do that. And I think it would unfairly prejudice the state to prohibit us from putting on the complete picture of what happened here.

In this case, any evidence of the attempt to cover up the conspiracy in the actual murder would be relevant because, one, it would show the defendant's participation in the conspiracy itself. It goes to consciousness of guilt.

One basis that's not enumerated in the Code of Evidence but that our Supreme Court has long recognized is the state's right to present a complete story of what happened, and that's been recognized throughout our case law, and I did cite that basis in my brief.

I think that the story here is one that is going to require presenting a -- a complete picture of all the evidence.

There's really no way -- I'm sorry, did Your Honor have a question?

THE COURT: No, I just want to confirm,

Fernando, are we moving too fast for you or are we at

a -- is this pace acceptable? I can't hear you?

THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, Your Honor, yeah, I can follow this pace, it's fine.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

THE INTERPRETER: Thanks, Your Honor. Thank you for asking.

THE COURT: I won't interrupt again.

THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for asking.

THE COURT: Thank you.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: So any of the evidence that is presented of, one, the defendant's involvement in the murder conspiracy and any overt acts in furtherance of it would also be motive evidence in the cover up. It would, again, prove her identity, it presents a consciousness of guilt picture. And as outlined in my brief, it actually goes to the essential elements of at least one of the charges, that being the tampering charge which requires that the state prove

that the defendant have a belief in the pendency of a criminal investigation.

Well, if the state is not allowed to put on the crime that would be the subject of that criminal investigation, how are we going to prove that charge? That necessarily creates a cross admissible basis there.

And as I think the court knows, it doesn't take any number of pieces of evidence, it's only one piece that the court needs to find as cross admissible that negates the -- the issue of prejudice.

So as I said, I think the -- the state's case is summarized in its brief, I don't want to repeat too much of what's in there, so I'm happy to take questions, concerns from the court. Otherwise, I'll reserve any further argument to respond to issues raised by defense counsel.

THE COURT: All right. Well, as a preliminary matter, the court has obviously looked at your briefs and also the case law. You would concede there is a difference between joining multiple defendants in a single trial versus joining multiple files against a single defendant?

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In the joint discussions.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Yes, that's a -- that's a valid distinction although the case law does permit a trial

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court to do both.

THE COURT: No, I'm aware of that, but some of the cases really do deal with multiple defendants one -- one trial versus multiple files one person, one trial, so.

As I look at the defense objection, I'm not going to speak for Attorney Schoenhorn, I'll be giving him the floor shortly, he says on page 2, unless the state discloses what evidence it claims is cross admissible, the motion for joinder is premature. Other than what you've already put in your brief I do see some different bullet points on page 2 of your brief, do you wish to elaborate on your offer of proof with respect to what might be cross admissible?

ATTY. CUMMINGS: I can, Your Honor, I just want to say I'm not familiar with any authority that requires the state to produce a shopping list of specific evidence it seeks to admit. It's more the evidence of a certain type from the case. The list I provided is not completely exhaustive.

I'll note the arrest warrant itself is 39 pages and that does not begin to cover all of the evidence. And for the state to have to identify every single piece of evidence it wants to produce and the cross admissible basis, I think, one, is counterproductive, and, two, I think if defense counsel is truly asking

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for that, that that's an unreasonable request. more importantly, it's one that is not required by the law. If the court finds that evidence from -- to prove the defendant's guilt as to one charge is -- is it relevant, and the other charges then all of that evidence would be admissible. And, again, I -- I said Your Honor only needs to find one piece of evidence.

But I -- I will note that there are -- there's -- there's witness testimony regarding the defendant's involvement in getting the car cleaned. I think that would show her involvement in the attempt to cover up, that would be relevant in the actual conspiracy charge.

As was recently disclosed, Mr. Mawhinney's testimony regarding her participation in the conspiracy would be relevant. And any of the tampering and conspiracy to tamper and hindering prosecution charges.

Obviously, the items that I've included in the brief itself, the alibi scripts I think go to both charges completely as one. They show agreement and unity of purpose between the defendant and Mr. Dulos, so they would be admissible in both the conspiracy to commit murder case, as well as any of the tampering and hindering prosecution charges.

And, again, Your Honor, I could -- I could

probably go on for the rest of the day if I have to go through the entire file and point out every piece of evidence.

I think if counsel believes there's -- there's specific pieces of evidence that are not cross admissible or are otherwise excessively prejudicial, then we can take those up on a one by one basis.

The -- a decision by the court to join the matters for trial does -- does not mean counsel can't raise objections to the admissibility of evidence down the road. And the court is always free to continue evaluating its joinder decision and decide to sever down the line if it decides that's a proper thing to do.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Counsel?

ATTY. CUMMINGS: No, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. Attorney Schoenhorn, this is -we're going to get to the -- your other motion, but
I'd like you just to respond on the motion to join.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Absolutely, Your Honor. My response is actually fourfold. So I have procedural, legal, factual and practical responses, but I -- this is the first time I've heard that when the -- the state claiming that it's prejudicial to the state to try these cases separately. There isn't a single

case that says that. It's prejudice to the defendant which is the cornerstone of all of the cases that talk about this issue.

But let me just address. I have been unable to find, if -- if one looks at Connecticut General Statute 54-57, which is one of the bases for joinder, it specifically refers to cases pending in the same court.

So when we talk about procedural, I think this motion is premature because if two of the cases, as I've argued, at least two of them are improperly in Stamford under either statutory or constitutional law, then the court can't out of a matter of convenience claim well, they're already here, I'll just combine them. There are three, I note, three separate conspiracies alleged.

I hear Mr. Cummings saying there's really only one conspiracy, then where are these extra charges from? The warrants -- I mean the long form Informations that were filed last August give almost no details.

I asked for a motion for a bill of particulars. And one of the other pleadings the state actually said, well, if we're not -- if we don't think I've been given enough information, then, yes, let's file a bill of particulars and then we'll get into more detail. Because the long form Information,

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essentially, just tracks the statute.

So it's not like I can know what evidence -- I'm going to emphasis -- factual evidence that I could rely on or the state can rely on to say that it's cross admissible. Their only argument in their memo is that it's cross admissible, not any other reason, as I understand it.

Be that as it may, to say that the warrants set forth their case also raises the issue -- I have filed now two motions to dismiss, there are several motions to suppress. And let me be clear if it's not clear, I've alleged in those motions that the warrants themselves contain outright falsehoods, reckless disregard of the truth, and important and material omissions. Unfortunately, Your Honor, you can't hear those, by statue you're -- and by the case law, you are prohibited from considering that.

THE COURT: I'm aware of that, Counsel.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Right.

THE COURT: But also there is a hundred pages of details set forth in those various warrants. I know you allege inaccuracies or omissions, but to say you don't have information, how do you -- what do you -- how do you respond? The state did lay out very lengthy affidavits, the factual accuracy of that will have to await a determination by one of my colleagues. But it's not that you are bereft of

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information, is it?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Well, I'm bereft of evidence that would be admissible in court. I submit that what Kimball wrote in those warrants is mostly theory, speculation. It might be evidence admissible against Mr. Dulos if he was still a defendant in a case, if there was a -- a case pending against Mr. Dulos then the argument would be different as to whether or not the case should be consolidated against my client.

But under the circumstances, almost everything that's set forth in that warrant has nothing to do with Ms. -- with Ms. Troconis. Even the pejorative remark by Mr. Cummings that there are alibi scripts, there's no such thing. There's a factually ninety nine percent accurate information, including her cellphone records that were spelled out.

And if we would -- if the court ordered the release of the interrogation videos of my client, there's, I believe, seven, eight hours of that, she explains in that that the divorce lawyer, Jacob Pyetranker, told Mr. Dulos to keep track of what you -- what was going on that Friday because he had gotten a report that Jennifer Dulos was missing, and they should keep track of their whereabouts.

The -- the original of that, of those documents
-- I want to emphasis, the original of those

documents were given to Attorney Bowman. The police and Mr. Colangelo all know that, they were sitting in the room on June $6^{\rm th}$ when Mr. Bowman confirmed that he had that, that those documents were given to him.

So whatever the police found at the house was a copy, a photocopy of something, not what was given to the lawyer. So to even to suggest that these are -- this is "evidence", at the very least, at the very least they would have to set forth what is actually admissible against my client.

I understand there's things like a -- you know, a person in the distance riding the bicycle and they say well, we think that that is Fotis Dulos, we think that's a -- the red truck that belongs to one of the employees of the Fore Group. We think that Fotis Dulos was driving it.

But let's be clear, Your Honor, they would, at least, in writing have to set forth what evidence is cross admissible. They mistake oral argument, they mistake theory versus evidence that is cross admissible.

Keep in mind, Your Honor, one of these charges is pretty clear is conspiracy to commit murder. The claim in that case is somebody was, I don't know, stabbed, cut up, they claim that there was a substantial amount of blood, that is belied by the evidence. Again, they want to put that in writing

and say, yes, there was a substantial amount of blood. There's no such evidence that I'm aware of, none.

As even the motion I filed today, again, it goes to the lack of probable cause, they found three billionths of a gram of DNA on a car seat that had been in the -- in the truck. To suggest that from that you can show a conspiracy to clean a truck because she picked up Fotis Dulos at the car wash to go to see her lawyer, to go to -- that's what was the next stop, her lawyer's office. Again, it's -- it's just pure speculation.

So to even suggest that, okay, she picked him up at the car wash, that should be combined with the allegations of an actual murder that -- that they're alleging, alleging. I don't believe that they have yet to prove an actual murder took place down in New Canaan is where the concept of prejudice is, unless I see some actual evidence that they intend to offer to show that.

So for -- to give you a perfect example, Your Honor, just -- just for the sake of argument, argue that she helped Fotis Dulos clean up and throw away trash in Hartford on Albany Avenue, which is the first arrest. In their memorandum they say she acted as a lookout. There is zero evidence of that.

So I would like to know what evidence they would

intend to show that she was a lookout. Looking out for what? It was in the middle of a public street, a major traffic thoroughfare in Hartford. And traffic is going by, it's a -- it's the middle of the late afternoon, it's not dark. So looking out for what? The sanitation truck?

I don't understand that there's actually evidence that they intend to offer that they could show is cross admissible. Because after all, charges like tampering and hindering, you don't actually have to prove the underlying crime to be proven, you just have to prove they -- she was aware there was a police investigation or an underlying felony, believe there was an underlying felony that she would be trying to get rid of evidence or in some way destroy evidence which is what those charges are about.

You don't even have to -- you just have to prove there was an investigation as to that with regard to tampering. You don't even need to have a completed investigation or prove the underlying offense.

So to suggest that they need to prove an actual murder occurred and that there was a conspiracy to commit it just to show that she helped dispose of evidence and was aware of it, that's not the -- the law, Your Honor. That's simply not the law.

So like I said, I don't even have all of the discovery. I keep filing -- and that's part of the

problem even with this motion being heard at this time. Your Honor has yet to move on the -- on the -- rule on the venue question, and that's why, you know, the question is whether those need to be ruled on first, number one.

But also, number two, it's not like the Wheel of Fortune or the board game, Battleship, where they get — I file a motion for discovery, they give me a massive amount of stuff. And I'll just note, it's a document dump, there's no, for most part, indexing. They give me five or six phone GPS and, what I call, cell records for multiple phones. It's not searchable. It's given to me in a form that I have to look through. So I can spend days, weeks, which I've done.

And then I notice something's missing, I file another motion, I don't get it until after I filed the motion, maybe a day or so before we're having another pretrial. Like I just got last week, Thursday or Friday, some additional material which we'll talk about in a minute.

But I'm just saying I still I don't have everything. And I'm going to have one of the state's attorneys there say that I -- there is nothing else and I just don't buy that. But they've -- I wouldn't want them to say that on the record because I know there are still things that I don't have.

In addition to that, Your Honor, if, in fact, there -- because there are also motions to suppress, ninety percent, perhaps -- and, again, Your Honor's not ruling on these so I don't want to put you in the -- in the uncomfortable position of having to consider the likelihood that some or all of the evidence that I've already filed motions to suppress and dismiss on will not come in. And, therefore, the court is making a decision on something whereas what they claim they're going to offer is not even going to come into evidence.

That's another reason why I submit that consolidating them at this point is completely premature.

And part of the awkwardness of that, Your Honor, is that part of the allegations in this is that you personally were misled by this -- by the investigators in this case. And then the state adds extra conspiracy charges, I note, without probable cause. If there's only one conspiracy as I hear Mr. Cummings say, then nolle those other charges. In fact, toss out two of the three criminal cases then we don't have to worry about consolidation. We have one criminal Information, they could -- they still are within the statute of limitations if they want to add a tampering and a hindering to that.

But the idea that two cases in Hartford should

be -- should be moved without agreement to another judicial district just for the sake of convenience for the state, I don't think there's a single case that I could find in Connecticut that allows that.

And so therefore, I -- I submit that proper jurisdiction is one of those issues that would have to be decided first, the fourth (sounds like) would be allowed to be presented in that -- in that way.

Now, I understand convenience, you know, that's usually a legitimate argument that the state has made. But I don't think it overcomes either the statutory jurisdiction requirement or, as I've argued, a Sixth Amendment Constitutional argument that a case has to be tried in the jurisdiction created by -- by law, in this case by the Connecticut Legislature.

The one thing I want to talk to as an aside, and the -- and the state keeps bringing it up in their -- in their memoranda, is the notion that Attorney

Andrew Bowman waived all of Ms. Troconis's rights without knowing it.

I was prepared to put Mr. Bowman on the stand to say he waived nothing. There were no discussions about keeping the cases somewhere that they didn't belong.

When a person is arraigned they are not necessarily even in possession of the criminal

Information ahead of time before bond argument is made. Motions aren't due at that point.

So the idea that it was waived, I just want to say for the record, to waive those rights based on -- on silence would not only be -- be improper, but I would -- I'll say on the record if, in fact, he did that, then he's committed legal malpractice. And I'm not willing to say that because in my view it's absurd to suggest that on early stages of the case before the discovery is -- is made that a -- that a lawyer should immediately assume that the case has to be -- the jurisdiction has to be raised when it's not subject matter jurisdiction but trial jurisdiction.

So --

THE COURT: Counsel, one point --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- as I'm listening to you.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yes.

THE COURT: You're claiming you have enough information and evidence to support moving these cases to Hartford, but on the other hand, you're claiming you don't have enough information or evidence to object to their motion to join.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: It's just based --

THE COURT: Is that correct?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- on the warrant. It's based on the -- Oh, I want to be clear, Your Honor,

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I'm not talking about evidence, I'm talking about the facial challenge, the two Informations state -- the first one states that the incident happened in Hartford on or about May 24th, 2019. The arrest from September states it happened in Avon, Connecticut on or about, I think, May 29th, 2019.

On their face, those two incidents occurred in the Hartford Judicial District. And this goes to the argument we made a month or two ago.

So I'm just indicating they're either -- if
there's only one case then why are there three
separate files that need to be consolidated, which I
submit the court cannot do from different judicial
districts without either an agreement or an order in
the -- they have to be remanded first and perhaps a
judge there decides whether there's a reason to
transfer them. I don't know, but I'm not arguing the
facts to Your Honor at this point, I'm arguing the
face of the criminal Informations. And that's how
the court decides where a case is to be tried.

So for example, if they say it happened in Stamford but it turns out it happened in Bronx, New York, well, then a case would end up getting dismissed. I -- that's the argument we made previously. I just don't want to get into that argument today.

THE COURT: No, you don't need to repeat your

1 earlier arguments, no.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Okay, right.

THE COURT: All right.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: So -- so now I look at cases like some of the ones that are cited here, the Boscarino -- State versus Boscarino, State versus Payne, P-A-Y-N-E. There's the LaFlora case. And Your Honor is correct, some of these cases deal with codefendants, not different cases. Some are the motive for the underlying crime predates if they've been combined.

But they would -- but the state does not have to prove a murder happened in order to prove that there was not with knowledge that a criminal investigation had commenced or was about to be commenced, which is the element that they have to prove.

And, moreover, I'll note the state has to present this by -- I think it's in the Payne case, a preponderance of the evidence that it's cross admissible, they haven't done that.

So at the very least they would have to make an offer of proof either on the record, we're gonna call this person, we're gonna put in this evidence that's also admissible against Michelle Troconis. They can't simply say we have all this sneaky stuff that — that Fotis Dulos was doing, we'll automatically admit it as to Michelle Troconis.

And like I said, I submit that's what in the warrants not only are mostly guess work, speculation, but there's falsehoods. And that's why simply saying I can look at the warrants, you know, if it turns out they don't have that evidence well, then they've misled whichever -- whoever the trial judge is as well by saying, yeah, we have this evidence and then not presenting it. And just saying, well, we already combined these cases, so you know, my bad. You know, I'm just a --

THE COURT: No, this court is always ready to revisit earlier rulings in light of new circumstances. And, again, I haven't made a ruling but there's no finality to anything until there's a verdict if this case ever gets to trial.

But I'm happy to take changed circumstances into account if one of my rulings turns out to be based on something that is no longer the operative assumption.

So --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Absolutely, Judge.

THE COURT: -- just to assure you of that.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Oh, no, I wasn't referring to you, I was saying the trial judge and the prosecutor at the time, whoever is trying the case, would suddenly that evidence is not coming in, is not admissible, but the case has already been transferred and we've already started trial. If a -- if a

mistrial happens then, I submit that's also double jeopardy, it was improperly transferred based on representations that they can't justify.

I look at page 2 of the memo, they have these, you pointed out these five bullets proofs — bullet points. There's reference to — to helping Dulos dispose of evidence from the crime scene in dumpsters by "acting as a lookout". There's no evidence of that. First of all, there's no dumpsters, so I don't even know where that comes from. This is just made up. There's no dumpsters. And I don't know what evidence there would be to say that she acted as a "lookout".

THE COURT: Is she sitting in the front passenger seat, allegedly?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Allegedly, yes. Okay.

But, again, you would need more than her mere presence to say that she's acting as a lookout. Do they have some witness to that? I don't -- I'm not aware of any.

We looked at the next thing, leaving -- assisted in having the car in which -- used to transport Jennifer's body, cleaned. I don't know what that evidence is, at all. It's not -- there's some speculation that the vehicle went down to New Canaan

based on it being seen in a cul-de-sac a half a mile away. But I don't know what that evidence is that she assisted. There's no evidence. There's no video. There's no evidence of that.

The next thing it says implementing an alibi script. She didn't help Dulos do anything. She prepared something in her own handwriting. That's the other thing though, the warrant falsely suggests that it's -- they're -- it's jointly written.

She wrote something, she gave it to her lawyer. They searched the house and they, I guess, searched every single piece of paper in the entire house. They find something Dulos wrote. There's none of my client's handwriting on that, on what Dulos wrote. Nothing. And there's no handwriting of Dulos on what she writes.

But she also had told the police, she told them why she did that and for whose purpose, that's notably omitted from the third warrant.

But again, I -- I'm just pointing out they've made representations here, who's going to testify to these things? How is it going to get into evidence to make these "cross admissible"?

It says repeatedly misleading the state police to throw off their investigation. Again, there are these videos, if they're going to play the videos, they're going to claim that's misleading? We don't

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need any witnesses from Westport or New Canaan from where the videos were taken to introduce that evidence. That can be played without having to call any additional witnesses.

And, finally, it says, assisted Dulos in creating a false telephone record at the time of Jennifer's murder. Again, I don't know who's going to testify to that.

If we're talking about this call from Greece that was -- that was -- was answered at the house in Farmington, again, I -- I don't know who's going to testify to that. But the phone record doesn't -- is not going to require any additional time.

But, again, if there are three separate conspiracies, answering a phone call is certainly has -- is not a -- considered a brutal or -- I'm going to look for the exact words here -- you know, the Boscarino Payne evidence, I want to use the correct terminology -- gruesome, violent, those are -- those are the questions.

I mean, and those cases say, look, you have one case where it's more -- that's gruesome and the others aren't. There's a more likelihood a jury's going to say well, look at all these different charges. You put these case -- cases together if there's evidence of one, it's more likely going to convict of something just because of combining.

That's the danger, that's the danger of the prejudice.

You know, I mean, I don't have any objection if the court wanted to -- You know, part of the problem is I file motions, I'm trying not to put everything out in the public because I don't want the courts or whichever judge is going to rule on these things to have to rule on something ex parte. They would require -- what I'm asking for is a hearing so I'm providing just enough evidence under Franks (sounds like) to get a hearing. And then we'd have a hearing in which all of these things can be played.

But I submit that even how the -- how the detectives characterized Ms. Troconis's six, seven, eight hours of interrogation was a misrepresentation, I've listened to it multiple times. And they -- it's -- it's just not actual evidence the way Mr. Cummings has described it.

If a murder happened at all -- and I'm not agreeing there -- there is one, there's right now a mystery and a disappearance -- that would be clearly more shocking, clearly more brutal based on the theory that the state has suggested. Cutting up a body, whatever they're claiming, it's not --

THE COURT: I didn't see --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- clear what evidence they're going to have.

1 THE COURT: I didn't see -- I didn't see any allegations they cut up a body. 2 ATTY. SCHOENHORN: They have an MD --3 THE COURT: Counsel, did -- I don't remember 4 5 seeing an allegation that in any way there was a dismemberment, et cetera. Just blood in the garage, 6 7 as I recall, and blood at the house. ATTY. SCHOENHORN: I'm sorry --8 THE COURT: But, again, we all know the law 9 makes no distinction between direct and 10 circumstantial evidence. You are correct, we -- we 11 12 apparently have no direct evidence that Jennifer Dulos is deceased. 13 14 ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Right. 15 THE COURT: We don't have it, it's 16 circumstantial. ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Right, right. Absolutely. 17 18 THE COURT: All right. ATTY. SCHOENHORN: But my point being is you 19 20 don't need an actual deceased in order to prove a 21 tampering or a --22 THE COURT: Yeah. ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- or a hindering --23 THE COURT: Right. 24 ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- unless the claim is going 25 26 to be that the only underlying crime -- and that's 27 what's also not clear, they won't tell me in the --

in the -- that's why I filed the motions for bill of particulars, what the underlying offense is that she's alleged to have assisted in covering up. And that's -- again, if there's only one --

THE COURT: Yeah.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- that at least makes it a little bit easier, but then there's only one conspiracy, not three, that they added. I think just -- I mean, if I'm being cynical, they added it --

THE MONITOR: I'm sorry, this is Lisa, the monitor, sorry, Judge, to interrupt. But that -- you keep -- he keeps breaking up quite a bit lately.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Oh, me?

THE MONITOR: So -- Yes. If you could mute yourself and then turn it -- then unmute yourself, that sometimes helps. I don't know if you've heard that, Judge, but it's --

THE COURT: No, it -- it has gone in and out but I've tried hard to listen, I have heard.

Everyone else is muted, but that makes more sense, just counsel and the court should be unmuted.

THE MONITOR: Right, thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: I do apologize, I don't if maybe if I speak a little quieter it will not break up as much, I don't know. I just -- I just don't know, so I do apologize to the court.

THE COURT: No, you have nothing to apologize for, Counsel.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: So and I'll just note one of the cases that the state cites is the *State versus*LaFleur, F -- L-A-F-L-E-U-R, it's 307 Connecticut at 115. And they talk about Practice Book Section 41-19, and they emphasize that the paramount concern in deciding on joinder -- and, again, all these cases deal with cases pending in the same court -- and when I say that, I mean properly in the same court, properly in the same court -- is whether the right to a fair trial is impaired.

And it does not address, though, when there's questions about cases coming from a different part of the state, and whether they're there, you know, improperly or properly how that should play out.

There's an omnipresent risk, as I note, I think Boscarino makes this clear, that a jury -- there's a danger when there's a whole bunch of charges, as there are here, that a person charged with so many things must be guilty of something. And that's something -- and that's a concern.

We looked at the *Boscarino* factors, I'm now moving into more of a legal argument here. There -- there are -- there is the whether or not there are discreet easily distinguishable factual scenarios. I submit there are not as the state is conceding, they

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think this is all cross admissible, so there's not going to be any distinction between these cases.

Two, whether any of these charges are of a violent nature or involve brutal and shocking conduct. If Dulos did what the state believes he did, I don't know of very many cases other than that — the Carpenter case, the airline pilot in Newtown, anything more brutal or shocking involving a single homicide victim, in fact, if there is one here.

And the duration and complexity of the trial. I mean, let's be clear about that, Your Honor, there are two cases where the -- where the evidence will take for the -- for the Hartford case, one day.

Their case in Avon involving a car wash, less than a day. But trying to prove a conspiracy to commit murder, I submit it's going to take months.

And so to throw those cases in and say they're easily distinguishable when I submit they're not, is one — is one of the things that the court has to set forth. And I submit that the state hasn't answered any of those issues. They simply said, well, you know, cross admissible and we think we can show this or that without testifying (sounds like) what the evidence is, how they would separate it. How they would say that whatever was in those trash bags Michelle must have known what's in them, and prove that she was — had access to it.

So I mean, these are just some of the legal practicalities that we're -- that we're facing with regard to combining these cases at this time. I mean, I may withdraw the objection after it's clearer what the evidence is.

I'm saying right now I can't agree to it and I don't think there's a basis right now on the record to agree to it.

Normally, when I've done -- when I've had cases where there's consolidation, including a case I had involving two unrelated murder cases that were combined into one. They were discreet, one case was three days, the other was four or five days, this goes back to the nineteen, I think late eighties, early nineties when I tried those cases. But one didn't overlap in any way other than the defendant who was the same defendant, but different witnesses, different police. Everything was separate.

So yes, in that case there was the prejudice was deemed minimal, and it could be solved with jury -- proper jury instruction.

THE MONITOR: We just lost the Judge.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Oh.

THE MONITOR: Yes.

(Pause)

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: I don't know, Judge, how much you lost of what I just said.

THE COURT: Well, here's where I was, all of a sudden it -- the screen went blank but you were discussing a murder trial or some charge thirty plus years ago in a joinder situation in Hartford.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Right. And just I'll -- I'll summarize, I don't need to go in -- I think the court reporter got it.

But basically, there were different police involved in the two, different witnesses for the two, the only thing that was similar was the same defendant was charged in both, and it was -- nothing was cross admissible in those two cases. They were both shocking cases, but they were individual cases and the jury was given multiple, multiple jury instructions of what to consider and what not to consider.

I think that a conspiracy is even tougher,

Judge, because under the -- under Bourjaily, which is
the U.S. Supreme Court case, a court would first have
to determine that any statement of any witness was
part of a conspiracy before it could be admissible.

So anything that Mr. Dulos may have said at different times outside my client's presence, anything that Mr. Dulos may have done outside my client's presence, you're going to have to first show it's related to a conspiracy first, and not something that's just hearsay related to a third or fourth

party under those circumstances.

I note one case, Your Honor, State versus Ellis, 270 Connecticut 337. If the defendant's conduct or if one of the coconspirator's conduct is substantially more egregious than in the other case, that's (indiscernible) is deemed improper. And I submit that that's where we're facing, that's where we're at right now.

Now, I can't get off this subject of joinder without discussing the recently disclosed information about the jailhouse informant named Kent Mawhinney. And, you know, I've watched his video, I understand he -- without claiming any liability for himself, he exonerates himself from any misconduct, he claims that he heard my client and Mr. Dulos solicit him to engage in a conspiracy to "do away" with Jennifer Dulos.

I'm going to -- so I don't hear Mr. Cummings say yes, that's our star witness, that's who we're going to rely on. You know, if that's the case, that certainly puts this in a different category.

But, you know, we have -- and this is why, you know, one of my outstanding motions is I have no discovery, whatsoever, about the circumstance that led Your Honor to release Mr. Mawhinney essentially with -- without putting up a penny that he won't get back. Fifty thousand dollars cash, his parents'

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house. He -- he has no -- he has no loss at this point to get out of jail.

And he did get out of jail and it was all done under some -- some -- I won't say secret, but it was all done ex parte. And there's no record, nothing that I can look up. The discovery doesn't answer those questions that was just given me last week.

I went through some, I went through it quickly, it -- it leaves out, it's got the -- the police and the lawyers back and forth editing a statement back and forth until they come up with what they like.

But it leaves out the state's attorney, it leaves out Mr. Colangelo, it leaves out the court. So we have to speculate on what happened to lead -you know, I mean, if it comes down to did Mr. Mawhinney sing for his supper, to use an old phrase, and that's why he got out.

We know, at least, that's the main case against Michelle Troconis, that's their star witness. All right. At least that's evidence I'm aware of, but they haven't said that's who they're going to rely on.

But even, I want to point out, even if they do and Mr. Mawhinney claims to have no knowledge of the scheme, what was done or anything, he's not admissible in a -- in a tampering case. His evidence would not be admissible in a car washing case.

knows nothing about any of those things.

Even if he's otherwise credible, and he could say he was sitting around while they enlisted him to participate and he just kept quiet, you know, you know, I mean and I -- and I'd -- and I'm gonna say I'll be happy -- I don't want to use the word happy, wrong term. I will be prepared to cross examine Mr. Mawhinney about those allegations, about his racism, his misogyny, his loss of his license, his violating of court orders, his fleeing the state and having to be stopped by the state police, all those things. But at least that's an allegation and the state could argue and I could respond how that evidence is admissible, cross admissible, because I submit it wouldn't be.

But be that as it may, I can't ignore the -- the fact that Mawhinney has made a statement and is seeking some kind of consideration. I can't even get his Hartford cases, it's all sealed.

THE COURT: Well, Counsel, let me just address one issue.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yeah.

THE COURT: You are correct, it would have been preferable to have a hearing where Mr. Mawhinney's bond was modified. I understand the defendant's spent a substantial amount of time incarcerated, I was in receipt of a written motion from his attorney

asking for modifications, the state did not object, I
granted it on the papers.

But I just don't -- I want to clear the air that you think somehow I was involved in some kind of a -- of a backdoor wink wink to get Mr. Mawhinney out of custody. He spent more time in jail than anyone in this case, as far as I know. And I -- I thought at the time, and I still believe that my actions at the time were correct.

Would it have been preferable to do it at a hearing on the record? Yes. I will concede that.

But that's where we are with Mr. Mawhinney. But --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Your Honor, I just want to -I'm not suggesting that it's improper to do that, I'm
just saying that if -- if Mr. Mawhinney is now the
star witness for the state, and I'm certainly
entitled to cross examine about the --

THE COURT: You will.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- circumstances of his release and the lack of objection by the state, it doesn't -- it doesn't imply the court did anything wrong. I want to be clear.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Maybe everyone should get their bonds reduced. I'm just saying --

THE COURT: (Indiscernible).

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: I'm not -- I'm not suggesting

it was improper, I'm just saying that it came with the state not objecting in -- in exchange for a quid pro quo is all I'm saying. And it doesn't -- and the court doesn't need, you know, the court -- the state doesn't object to a bond reduction, the court will grant it ninety percent of the time.

So I'm -- I didn't want the court to think I thought Your Honor did something --

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- incorrect.

THE COURT: Well, I respect the presumption of innocence and I know that there's financial and nonfinancial conditions of release, and Mr. Mawhinney is on his own bracelet right now as we speak, so.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Right.

ATTY. COLANGELO: Your Honor, if I may. You know, Counsel is way far afield on -- on the motion to join, and he started talking about Mr. Mawhinney. And I was the one that agreed to the motion, Your Honor.

And if you look at the motion it was pretty clear that his father had a substantial illness and he wanted to go see him. He was posting substantial property and interest in that property. That is why I didn't object, just like I didn't object to Ms. Troconis going to see her father when Attorney Schoenhorn raised that as an issue a few months ago,

because he was recovering from COVID.

THE COURT: Noted.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: I thought only one state's attorney was speaking, but, you know, I mean, I understand what Mr. Colangelo is saying. He did object at the time on the record, so let's not -- I don't want to get into that with him right now.

I think that's all I have to say on the motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: And I want to emphasize though, I brought up Mawhinney because the state would have to make an offer of proof. They can't simply say we think she was involved, we think she was doing this or that. What's the evidence that would be cross admissible, not we'll just put these cases together and we can all speculate together on what is cross admissible or not.

As I understand admissible, it's admissible as evidence and the state has to offer by a preponderance what that evidence is going to be before there is a decision. And that goes back to my first argument, it's premature until they've at least made an offer of proof as to what evidence they believe is cross admissible in those three cases. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney Cummings, you're muted.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Your Honor, can you hear me?

THE COURT: Yes.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: All right. If I could -- I'll just briefly respond if that's all right.

I just want to start off addressing one of the procedural issues Attorney Schoenhorn raised regarding joinder and how it would be improper, I guess, to join Informations from outside the judicial district. That's, actually, a ground to have the cases tried here, Practice Book 41-23 governing the transfer of prosecutions grants the court the ability to transfer a matter to this judicial district -- Quote, where the joint trial of Informations is ordered pursuant to Section 41-19 and the cases are pending in different judicial districts or geographical areas.

So I don't think there's any merit to Counsel's argument, at all. The Practice Book specifically contemplates that if the court were to determine the trial should be joined for any of the -- the reasons raised by the state, then it wouldn't matter that they were in judicial -- different judicial districts, they would all be tried where the court orders the joinder motion.

Moving on from that, I do want to note that what the state sees here, and I will address the arguments

that he's raised in more detail, but there's this overarching theme to Attorney Schoenhorn's arguments, the motions he's filing, which is that he wants the state to explain it's theory of the case and the evidence in a lot more detail than the state is required to do.

The state's turned over substantial discovery and materials, we've set forth the allegations.

There's, as Your Honor noted, three comprehensive warrants counsel has at his disposal. The state is not required to hold defense counsel's hand and walk him through every piece of evidence explaining how the state intends to use it at trial and what witnesses it intends to call.

He's got to put in the legwork to actually preparing his own defense. We don't have to prepare it for him.

And all of these motions he's filed are, basically, complaining that I don't understand the significance of this evidence, the state needs to explain what it's doing more. I don't know a single case that says we have to do that. And I don't know a single case that says we have to proffer evidence in any particular detail.

In fact, none of the cases I reviewed in researching his motion say anything close to that.

Attorney Schoenhorn is crafting special rules for the

state that -- that, frankly, don't exist.

Now, I -- I did explain some of the evidence that we've already talked about, I've listed some in the motion. He has a copy of Attorney Mawhinney's recorded interview, he has a copy of his client's interview with the police. He's right, some of this evidence is not direct, but this law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. And much of this case is going to be proven by circumstantial evidence.

Ms. Troconis's interviews with the state police I think are very telling, not in what she directly says, but what she doesn't say. She, basically, lies through her teeth about where she was, where Mr. Dulos was, what she was doing on certain dates.

The statement she gives track along her alibi script almost exactly. So this argument that the scripts themselves are -- are just these innocent productions that her attorney asked her to write, they turned out to be lies.

She admitted in the interviews that they were lies, she said yes, this is not true what we wrote down here and what I said to you.

So when counsel says well, what witness are we going to put on, we're going to put on the state police detective who's going to talk about what she said, and that's admissible because it's a party

opponent statement.

Now, I could do this with every piece of evidence but, frankly, the state doesn't have to prove every ground for admissibility on every piece of evidence it might admit. If the court rules that the evidence is cross admissible and before trial counsel succeeds in what he claims he's going to do, which is show that much of it is inadmissible, then the court can reevaluate the joinder decision in light of those events.

But we're conflating multiple different issues on a fairly simple one which is -- which is the joinder issue.

THE COURT: Attorney Cummings --

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- is the state intending to call Mr. Mawhinney as a witness?

ATTY. CUMMINGS: As of now, yes, I believe so.

Obviously, that could change. The -- counsel's claiming that this is the state's star witness, I think counsel has straw-manned much of what the state has said in -- in this argument and in others.

We don't have a star witness. Attorney
Mawhinney's statement is one piece out of many pieces
pointing to the defendant's guilt in this case that
the state may put on at trial.

Now, again, Your Honor is going to be in a

position to make a lot of rulings on evidence prior to trial, if those rulings affect the admissibility of evidence that the court relied on in deciding to join the cases, then certainly, Your Honor, it would be fair to revisit his ruling.

But I think a good test for this would be if the state police had only submitted one warrant with all of these charges on it based on the affidavits that were presented, would anyone find that improper in any way? I think that the court would sign that warrant and we would all be here on one case, and no one would bat an eye at it.

It's just because the cases were all docketed based on the timing of the arrests that now we have a joinder motion. But I don't think it's controversial that the state is going to be relying on evidence from all three cases in all of the other cases.

Counsel makes the argument that we don't have to prove a murder in order to prove a tampering. Now, maybe technically, legally, we don't have to. But we certainly have a right to introduce evidence of the crime that's being tampered with to show the defendant's mental state.

We're not that hamstrung simply because we don't have to make a legally sufficient case we're not allowed to. The state is allowed to present any admissible evidence to prove its case that it has in

its possession.

So I think in this case, you know, Your Honor has been given multiple pieces of evidence at this point that would be cross admissible. If we want to devote an entire day to going through every other piece of evidence and how it might be used, we can certainly do that. I don't see how that's going to be a productive use of the court's time.

The state is not obliged to "show its hand" in the detail that I'm sure counsel would like it to.

I'm quoting from the -- the Frazier case, which is Connecticut 194 Conn. 223 that where the defendant has at his disposal numerous materials from which to gather the information necessary to his trial defense, including the state's file and police reports, there's not a showing of prejudice.

And, frankly, counsel's got multiple police reports, he's got boxes of discovery, he's got to actually put the legwork in to reading that material, deciphering what significance it might be.

The state is not going to send someone to his office to hold his hand and go through every piece of evidence and describe how it might conceivably be used at trial. This is part of doing defense work, and, frankly, you know, I don't think it's fair to expect the state to -- or to have to show a shopping list of its evidence on a joinder.

We did go through a number of pieces. I think the court's got the information it needs at its disposal and I would ask that the court join these matters for trial for the reasons that we stated in our motion.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: May I respond very briefly, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Briefly, and then because it's the state's motion I'll give them the last word. Yes, Counsel.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: All right. I -- I think there's a difference, and I hear what Mr. Cummings is saying, between the fact that I have all this discovery -- and I've gone through all of it, versus convincing a court by a preponderance of the evidence that the information is cross admissible in the other cases.

All I've heard is well, there's the interrogation. I think Mr. Cummings may regret ethically saying my -- offering the opinion that -- Quote, my client was "lying through her teeth". I may feel that and say the same thing about that -- about the State Police Detective Kimball, but I'm not. I'm simply saying that the information he presented is false and/or recklessly disregarded the truth.

It's up to a judge to decide whether or not it

was deliberately false (indiscernible) or by leaving out certain things.

So when Mr. Cummings says my client was lying, I have to respond by saying but you read -- you watch those videos, and I don't know if the court has seen them, the detectives --

THE COURT: I have not.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: The detectives lied through their teeth to my client and then tell her we know that there were -- and this is why I brought it up -- those were body parts in those garbage bags. They say that to her. She starts crying hysterically.

So they lied a million times, and then said oh, she changed her story because they said it would be not possible not to know what was in those bags.

So I don't want to get into a credibility fight with Mr. Cummings or Mr. Colangelo, or for that matter, the police detectives in this case. There's a missing person, they want to solve that, I get that.

However, I submit that when the court decides on consolidating cases, particularly when they belong in another jurisdiction, the state has a burden not to say well, we got all this stuff, but to specifically say here is what we intend to offer, which is cross admissible. I don't have to guess on that, nor does the court have to guess about that. And that's all I

wanted to say in response.

THE COURT: Okay. Attorney Schoenhorn, when you were talking you used the term jurisdiction, I know you meant venue, most --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- a lot of people confuse the issues. I know you're not confused, you're just speaking colloquially. But --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yes, I meant (indiscernible).

THE COURT: -- you concede that venue can be an either or proposition. In other words, it's not a zero-sum game. If venue is properly in Hartford then to -- there is no other place in the state that venue could possibly given -- it's all fact specific, is it not? In other words, it could be an either or venue situation, could it not?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Well, not for the first two cases. I mean, the third -- the -- we had this debate about whether Connecticut is like the federal -- there's no Connecticut case that says conspiracy and the underlying crime are basically the same for purposes of venue or vicinage.

Connecticut has taken the position -- and I've argued this before, I don't want to repeat from the earlier back in December, but Connecticut says that the (inaudible) of the -- of a conspiracy is where the agreement was reached, not where someone

committed an overt act.

The feds, the federal courts have taken the opposite position. So I don't know if Your Honor recalls I made that argument, it's in my memorandum filed in response to the -- to the venue issue.

And like I said, it may become where the trial happens becomes jurisdictional if the court accepts my Sixth Amendment argument which I argued at that time. But I -- I didn't want to get into that now.

And I understand Your Honor's position. And I know there's the -- the case that began with an O, I can't remember, that disposed of that issue before more recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on the partitioning of the Sixth Amendment and the part that says a jury in the jurisdiction created by law and whether that's applicable to the state's or not.

All the other cases it's either a dictum or are waived by the defendant, and therefore, not considered for Golding purposes. I don't know if that answers your question, I was trying not to go in that direction --

THE COURT: All right.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- for this argument today.

THE COURT: Well, thank you very much. Attorney Cummings, last -- last closing point on this motion.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Yes, Your Honor, just -- just very briefly. One, I -- I'm using counsel's client's

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own words, it was her who admitted she was not truthful with the state police during her interviews.

As far as actual preponderance of the evidence, pieces of the evidence, you know, as we indicated, the testimony of Mr. Mawhinney that defendant's client — that the defendant was involved in the conspiracy to murder Jennifer; that testimony would certainly be relevant in any trial related to the tampering of evidence or the hindering of the prosecution of Mr. Dulos. Arising out of that murder it shows knowledge, consciousness of guilt, motive, identity.

As to other pieces of evidence, such as the cleaning of the Toyota Tacoma, that would be relevant to show that she was aware of the murder itself and was a party to that. It goes to identity, motive, and consciousness of guilt. All of the evidence goes to complete the story.

I don't think the claim that we haven't identified a sufficient evidentiary basis with a -- to a preponderance of the evidence standard is fair or accurate.

We have discussed specific pieces of evidence and it's pretty, I think, facially clear how it relates to the other cases.

But what I'm objecting to is having to itemize and go into deep detail on all of it going forward.

So we rest on the -- the brief the state submitted at this point.

THE COURT: Well, the court is not, obviously, going to rule from the bench today. So let's turn now to the defense motion to modify the non-financial conditions of the defendant's release.

Ms. Troconis, could you join us please, this is your proceeding, at least I'd like to see your face. If you don't -- you don't wish to speak that's your prerogative, but could you please come on screen.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: We see her, Your Honor, she is there.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I don't see her.

ATTY. CUMMINGS: Your Honor, I see her, she's waiving at the camera right now.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's not coming through on my screen, I'll accept your representation.

But I did read your -- your motion, Attorney Schoenhorn, this won't take as much time as your earlier argument, but what would you --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: No.

THE COURT: -- like to say in support of it.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yes. The court very graciously has -- am I off -- I'm not on mute. The court has very graciously allowed Ms. Troconis to travel extensively coming back and forth. There are certain things that I'm just asking now after now a

year, over a year and a half, that the -- the court remove the GPS monitor. If they want her to check in on a regular basis by calling or texting, I do not have any problem with that.

The GPS -- the -- I -- I did some research and, apparently, you know, I do have some case law not from Connecticut that extreme long term GPS monitoring for people who are not convicted of a crime as opposed to let's say, sex offenders, may indeed be considered a -- a form of punishment. There's a New Jersey Supreme Court case that says that, for example.

In addition, the fact that her -- her movements are constantly being monitored albeit by the Probation, I've been unable to find the rules and regulations on who they are in touch with and what they do with that information and how long they even store it that would -- that that would, in effect, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.

But as a practical matter, as I said, the court has allowed her to travel on planes to travel to Colorado, to travel to Florida, I'm just asking --

THE COURT: Well, she's a mother, isn't she?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: She is a mother. Her daughter --

THE COURT: And that's why the court -- I know the best interest of the child is not the standard

here but I'm -- I'm not insensitive to the fact that a child needs her mother, and her child is apparently a competitive skier and I've allowed her to go to Colorado --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Right.

THE COURT: -- to support her daughter in those endeavors.

But I thought your motion was predicated on a desire for her to ski and the bracelet interfered with the boot, is that accurate?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Well, what it -- what it is, Your Honor, it's not for her to ski, it's for her to accompany her daughter to the -- on a chairlift which nobody's allowed on unless they have skis on.

So it's -- it's not possible, we talked about maybe a bracelet one to put on her -- on her wrist, but for reasons the -- back in the past, that was rejected.

So I just bring this up now, she's proven herself that she follows all directions. It is somewhat at this point of a burden, it has to charge for an hour or two every single day. I ask the court that in light of her following every direction since the court first released her after the first arrest on June 3rd, 2019, and because of COVID, who knows when we're going to even get to this case, that the court consider removing the bracelet, other

conditions when she travels she will give notice. We don't have any problem with any of those things, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Who wishes to respond to this motion?

Okay.

THE COURT:

ATTY. COLANGELO: I believe I'm up, Your Honor.

ATTY. COLANGELO: As Your Honor indicated, she's a mom, the state didn't object to any of those requests for her to travel and -- and she was able to do so because we knew where she was.

She has no community ties to Connecticut, there's nothing keeping her here. Everything, actually, that she has is in other parts of either the country or other countries, so the GPS monitoring is imperative so that we know where she is and to keep her -- have the ability to know where she is, Your Honor, because there's no community ties. I'll just be brief.

If counsel wants to do a bracelet instead of the monitor around her ankle, I have no objection to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't know if that's even possible given the technology. I also know from discussions with Probation that I -- I believe that the new batteries that these GPS units employ do not require an hour or two of tie up every single day to maintain

a charge, but I could be wrong.

I don't know if there is a bracelet possibility.

If -- if there is --

ATTY. COLANGELO: I don't know.

THE COURT: -- I would be amenable to considering it, I'm -- But, Attorney Schoenhorn, anything further?

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: It's my understanding that even if there are these new bracelets, she's not being given one, she still has to charge every day.

And I've been receiving the -- the emails from the -- from the Probation or the CSSD saying oh, you're battery's getting low, you have to charge it. And she has to go find some place to plug in.

There are wrist bracelets, for reasons that I'm not clear on they didn't want to give her one, but I would ask that even for the timing she would -- it would be ninety nine thousand times better to have a wrist bracelet, which I know they can do, than an ankle bracelet at this point. And we would settle for that right now.

ATTY. COLANGELO: If they're available, Your Honor, I don't have objection to that.

THE COURT: Well, let's -- I -- I don't want to be premature and rule on their availability. First of all, they also have to not only be available, but being used by the State of Connecticut. I'm not

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going to order the CSSD to go out and purchase technology they're not currently employing.

But Counsel, I'm going to deny your motion because I'm not hearing that it substantially interferes with her ability to make an -- make a living, it's recreational activity. Granted, it's important for her daughter, but I'm not hearing compelling reasons to revisit the non-financial conditions.

I do applaud your client, she has been compliant, that's why she has been allowed to travel the way the court has allowed it. But I'm going to keep the conditions in place without -- subject to being revisited if, in fact, there is ankle -- excuse me, if there is, in fact, wrist technology, number one. And number two, it's in use here in the State of Connecticut. Then I will take another look at it because it sounds like we have an agreement on that score.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: And -- and while we're on the subject though, Your Honor, could I at least then make the oral motion that she be allowed to stay with her daughter, unless she's needed back here, for the time being while she's in school in Colorado while -- unless you need her physically present in Connecticut. She -- I'm just asking that instead of her having to come back and travel back and forth

with the way that it's been going up until now since last fall.

THE COURT: State?

ATTY. COLANGELO: I'm not going to take the position, Your Honor, I'll leave it up to the court.

THE COURT: All right. And you -- you mentioned the trial, unfortunately, yes, the COVID has delayed this and multiple other jury trials, I eagerly await the time when we can resume that vital function.

I would have hoped if we had not lost 2020, nine months of it, that we would have been able to try this case this spring or summer. But that's -- we're not even in the position to try older cases that are ahead of it in -- in time. So we're going to have to maintain the pretrial status quo for now.

But I will issue a written decision, probably one incorporating both the motion to join and the motion to transfer venue. But you can expect something from the court, I thank you for your time.

Attorney Schoenhorn, because I may be the trial judge, I'd rather not pre-try this case. I'm happy to see if Judge White is available or if you could agree with counsel. The technology does allow these remote hearings so it's less burdensome for you to have to come down here, you're speaking now from the comfort of your home, and I applaud that, I'm a little jealous.

But I'm saying I'm not sure Judge White's available right now, I know counsel's all here on the screen. He has other duties as PJ, so I'll leave that to you to speak to Criminal Case Flow to get some time with Judge White if you think it would be productive.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: That'll be --

ATTY. COLANGELO: Thank you.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: That'll be fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: There were a couple of other procedural matters housekeeping matters, I was hoping that we could at least address if not rule -- get a ruling on.

THE COURT: Tell me.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: One is -- one is my pending motions for bill of particulars, and the other is the outstanding discovery including Your Honor was going to issue a ruling about the lengthy child -- I mean, the child custody study that was done by the family court.

I thought the court had indicated it was going to rule before today's court date, but I may be wrong about that.

(Phone ringing)

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Attorney Colangelo?

ATTY. COLANGELO: He has long form Informations,

Your Honor, that satisfies the bill of particulars.

I think Your Honor does have the information you need to make a ruling on the report.

THE COURT: All right.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: And I'll just note the bill of -- motion for bill of particulars was filed after the long form Information because in my view, it just traps the statute. And even today's ruling -- today's argument indicates that in terms of exactly what they're alleging, especially with three separate conspiracies alleged, Judge, I would need a little bit more information. Is it really only one, like I just heard Mr. Cummings argue, or are there three separate ones. And that would track what I would have to do to prepare.

ATTY. COLANGELO: And, Your Honor, there was brief filed following the case law in Connecticut as to why he's not entitled to a bill of particulars based on the long form. But I don't know if counsel took the time to read that.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the court will issue rulings on both of these outstanding matters.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: And then, finally, Your

Honor, there is a -- an outstanding request. I was

just trying to do this off the record months ago with

Mr. Colangelo.

At the time of the search on May 31st, 2019,

basically, the police took every single electronic devise in the house, including my client's daughter's computer; my client's work computer, her mother's phone and computers. So there are a number of -- of electronic devices, there was nothing on those. And they've just held on to them.

My client's daughter needs her -- her computer, it had all her school work from last -- from that year on it. It had a bunch of other stuff. Her mother's work computer, her mother is a psychologist. It had notes from her clients, they took that, as well.

So I'm asking if the electronics of my client and her family could be returned. If there's data they needed on it, I won't object to them -- I mean, they don't need the physical device if they've taken data off it, that's what admissible, if at all, not the -- the laptop or the -- or the --

THE COURT: The hardware.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- cellphone. The hardware, exactly.

ATTY. COLANGELO: When -- when counsel sent an email to me, Your Honor, I asked him to give me a list of the devices that he was asking for and that I would look at them. I indicated that if anything was going to be used as evidence that, you know, obviously, we wouldn't be turning that over. But

everything else if we didn't find anything of evidentiary value we didn't have an objection to that.

I don't recall seeing an email from him saying, hey, the laptop that's, you know, on the, you know, Number 52, that's her daughter's laptop, we'd like that back.

So you know, saying that the, you know, the IMac or whatever it is, you know, he needs to be a little specific so that we can make a determination as to what we're going to give back to him.

And I indicated to him what, you know, that I had no objection to that as long as there was nothing of evidentiary value on them.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yeah, Mr. Colangelo is correct, on November 24th we had that exchange. The trouble is by looking at a serial number on a -- on a laptop, and there's like a dozen, at least, that were seized of different devices, it's difficult for me, especially when -- when the daughter is not in Connecticut or the mother to figure out from a serial number which devise is which.

The list does not -- this was on the search, the return to the court of that search warrant of the house on 4 Jefferson Crossing. I can't tell which one is which, I can't. My client is here, she couldn't at the time even just go through every

1 receipt she had down in Florida to determine which 2 devises are which. 3 I guess the question is there are all these devises in evidence or in -- in return, they're in 4 police -- the evidence locker. I -- I don't know how 5 else I could be more specific than that. 6 7 I seem to remember the daughter's laptop has harps or some animal on it, it's obviously a child's 9 computer is my recollection. THE COURT: Perhaps -- perhaps what the state 10 11 could do, it doesn't seem unduly burdensome. Ιf we're talking about a dozen or so pieces of 12 13 electronic hardware? 14 ATTY. COLANGELO: More than that, Your Honor --15 ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Yes, yes. ATTY. COLANGELO: -- I mean, there are --16 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 ATTY. COLANGELO: If he gives me a list with the 19 description --20 THE COURT: Yeah --21 ATTY. COLANGELO: -- of the --THE COURT: -- can you give him the name and 22 23 brand and -- Right. ATTY. COLANGELO: But, it's, Judge, you know, 24 again, trying to figure out which is which, now we 25 have to boot it up, make a determination of whose it 26 27 is.

THE COURT: No, no, I meant in terms of it's a Dell laptop, or it's a -- it's an Apple iPad, that kind of -- not -- not getting into booting anything up. But just basically so we can distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant. And if the state doesn't have an evidentiary use for it, it should be returned. But I'm not ordering anything at this point. But just see if we can make an accommodation by giving more information to allow the other side to make a request. And then we'll rule if the needs for court intervention.

ATTY. COLANGELO: That's what I was waiting for for counsel to let me know what he's looking for and I'll be happy to make that inquiry.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: All right.

THE COURT: Thank you.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: I will -- I will then go through with my client and her, perhaps her daughter and her mother to try and be more specific as to an ID, some information that will make it clear of which computer is which, so.

THE COURT: Thank you.

ATTY. COLANGELO: Attorney Schoenhorn, even a, you know, a make and model, you know, type, color, something.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: All right. Okay.

THE COURT: Very good. All right. Counsel,

thank you all for your participation. Do we need -- we need to set another date at this time or --

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: Not at this time, we can -we can -- I would like to, at least, find out if I'm
getting some of this additional discovery, like the
long report. Obviously, be able to review that
before there's further discussion.

Like I said, material was sent to me on Friday by Mr. Cummings, thank you very much. And I haven't had a chance to analyze it, I went through the type of material it is, but I will obviously need to digest that. So 30 days or so would be good for a pretrial.

THE COURT: Yes.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: But this, you know, I only found out last week that, from Natalie, that you wanted to have an argument today, and then we don't have time really to just discuss the pretrial. A lot of this stuff, some of this stuff we could be talking about off the record --

THE COURT: I understand.

ATTY. SCHOENHORN: -- I just note for the record.

THE COURT: Does the state anticipate substantial additional discovery beyond what it's already provided to this date?

ATTY. COLANGELO: No

THE COURT: I'll open that to either prosecutor. 1 ATTY. COLANGELO: No, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 ATTY. COLANGELO: Substantial? No. 4 ATTY. SCHOENHORN: No, but I note --5 6 THE COURT: Any scientific tests that are not 7 completed? ATTY. COLANGELO: There are tests being 8 performed, I don't know, there are things that are 9 being completed and have not been completed, yes, 10 there is. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. ATTY. COLANGELO: I mean, they're working on 13 things every day, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 ATTY. COLANGELO: As I get it I turn it over to 16 counsel, that's what we do. 17 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, all, 18 for your participation. We'll stand in recess. 19 20 Thank you. * * * * 21 22 23 24 25

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT

: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD/NORWALK

V.

: AT STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT

MICHELLE TROCONIS

: FEBRUARY 2, 2021

<u>CERTIFICATION</u>

I hereby certify the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcription of the audio recording of the above-referenced case, heard in Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Connecticut, before the Honorable John F. Blawie, Judge, on February 2, 2021.

Dated 2/19/2021 in Stamford, Connecticut.

Lisa O'Shea

Court Recording Monitor

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